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Optimizing the harvesting and analysis of student data promises to 
clear the fog surrounding the key drivers of student success and 
retention, and provide potential for improved student success. At 
the same time, concerns are increasingly voiced around the extent 
to which individuals are routinely and progressively tracked as 
they engage online. The Internet, the very thing that promised to 
open up possibilities and to break down communication barriers, 
now threatens to narrow it again through the panopticon of mass 
surveillance. 
Within higher education, our assumptions and understanding of 
issues surrounding student attitudes to privacy are influenced both 
by the apparent ease with which the public appear to share the 
detail of their lives and our paternalistic institutional cultures. As 
such, it can be easy to allow our enthusiasm for the possibilities 
offered by learning analytics to outweigh consideration of issues 
of privacy.  
This paper explores issues around consent and the seemingly 
simple choice to allow students to opt-in or opt-out of having 
their data tracked. We consider how 3 providers of massive open 
online courses (MOOCs) inform users of how their data is used, 
and discuss how higher education institutions can work toward an 
approach which engages and more fully informs students of the 
implications of learning analytics on their personal data. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.3.1 [Computers and Education]: Computer Uses in Education -
Distance learning, K.7.4 [The Computing Profession]: 
Professional Ethics – Codes of ethics   
General Terms 
Management, Documentation, Security, Legal Aspects. 
Keywords 
Learning analytics, ethics, informed consent, opt out, opting out 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The growing use and enthusiasm for learning analytics mirrors 
both the rapid development of technologies and the increased 
understanding of how student data may be effectively applied to 
improve learning and student success [9, 10, 16, 54, 55].  
However, the emergence of learning analytics as an approach 
which underpins teaching and learning strategy has in turn raised 
awareness amongst students and other stakeholders regarding both 
the uses to which student data may be put and the approaches 
employed within learning analytics [10, 56, 57].The issue of 
student privacy self-management is furthermore embedded in 
definitions of privacy [24, 30, 39, 58, 67] and concerns that 
“discussions of privacy merely scratch the surface” and we need 
“a better understanding of the problems; we must learn how they 
developed, how they are connected, what precisely they threaten, 
and how they can be solved” [58]. Our definitions, as well as our 
legal and regulatory frameworks often struggle to keep up with 
technological developments and changing societal norms [64].  
Amidst increasing concerns around ethical issues in the 
harvesting, analysis and use of student data resides the question of 
whether students should have the opportunity to ‘opt out’ of 
institutional surveillance. What are the implications of learning 
analytics and student surveillance on the social contracts that 
higher education institutions (HEIs) have with their stakeholders, 
and, in particular, their students [29, 31]? How does allowing 
students to opt out of the harvesting, analysis and use of their 
personal data impact on the fiduciary duty of HEIs [14, 34] given 
their responsibility to ensure appropriate support and guidance to 
students in their learning journeys? Do students understand the 
benefits and/or costs of opting in or out at the moment they make 
a choice? [e.g., 22].  
As the uses to which student data are put continue to evolve, it is 
becoming clear that existing policies may be failing to keep pace 
with those changes. In previous research, Prinsloo and Slade [51] 
investigated the extent to which current policies at two mega 
distance education institutions address the harvesting, analysis 
and use of student data. The study found that, while informed 
student consent was an established principle when data is used for 
research purposes [42], student consent was not required in the 
day-to-day harvesting and use of student data. The collection, 
analysis and use of student data was also scattered between a 
number of policies and role players.  
Furthermore, until recently most of the data harvested and 
analysed has been aggregated and issues of anonymity and privacy 
have not been problematic. Learning analytics has changed this. 
The potential of learning analytics lies in harvesting personalised 
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data to intervene, where appropriate and possible, at an individual 
level. This raises a number of ethical and practical concerns [22, 
42, 57].  
Some HEIs are responding by creating specific policy around 
their use of learning analytics, for example, the Open University 
in the UK released a new policy on the ethical uses of learning 
analytics to students and staff in October 2014 [50]. Although 
such policies do much to address transparency and boundary 
concerns, there remain further issues around the specific area of 
informed consent and the possibilities of students opting out of 
having their data used. 
As far as we could establish, there is little or no published 
research or theorising in the context of higher education whether 
students should have the option to opt-out of having their learning 
data harvested, analysed and used, often in combination with 
other sets of data. Though Buchanan [6] and Slade and Prinsloo 
[56, 57] point to the possibility of increasing transparency and 
trust by providing an option to opt-out; there is no published 
research on the feasibility or implications of such an option. In 
one consultation reported by Slade and Prinsloo [57], student 
representatives clearly indicated that they would expect to have an 
option to opt-in or opt-out.  
Though the notion of opting out is yet to be seriously considered 
in higher education; the discourse is well-established in fields 
such as legal and surveillance studies [1, 2, 24, 39, 40, 47, 60, 61] 
Stoddart [62] suggests that it is possible to approach the issue of 
‘privacy self-management’ either from a “rights-based or 
discursive-disclosive” approach. The first approach sets out 
procedural guarantees establishing rules and access to satisfaction 
if these rules are breached. Stoddart [62] and others indicate that 
this approach appears increasingly ineffective. The “discursive-
disclosive” approach situates surveillance in the context of what is 
being done, by whom, and for what purpose and then to 
investigate alternative approaches to satisfy the need that resulted 
in surveillance.  
It is unlikely that increasing ethical concerns and issues may be 
addressed so simply. The impact of technologies and the 
“elaborate lattice of information networking” [60], suggests that 
legal frameworks may never be enough to completely safeguard 
users against possible abuse and misuse of their data [52].  
In this paper we will situate the question of allowing students to 
opt-in or out against an overview of discourses regarding privacy 
self-management and the sharing of personal data. An analysis of 
the Terms and Conditions (TOCs) of three providers of massive 
open online courses (MOOCs) provides a sense of the 
accessibility of these TOCs, the nature and scope of data 
harvesting, the use and sharing of data, and issues regarding user 
access to their own data. Based on the literature review and 
analysis, we then formulate a number of theses for consideration 
in learning analytics.  
2. SOME EXISTING APPROACHES TO 
PRIVACY SELF-MANAGEMENT 
It falls outside the scope of this paper to discuss the vast literature 
(historical and current) addressing the notion of privacy [24, 30, 
39, 53, 58, 67]. Privacy self-management and consent is therefore 
a fluid and changing notion worth exploring. It is also important 
that legal and regulatory frameworks differ between geopolitical 
and institutional contexts.  
Solove [59] states that “Consent is an under theorized concept 
that is crucial for privacy and many other areas of law. Consent 
performs an enormous amount of work. Activities that would 
otherwise be illegitimate are made legitimate by consent”.  Most 
of the current models informing our assumptions about consent 
and privacy self-management are primarily based on a 
paternalistic approach. There are two main arguments against an 
uncritical adoption of such an approach:  
(1) The correctness of our choices regarding privacy and data use 
is not always clear [569], and is dependent on context [49]. 
Despite assumptions to the contrary, there are individuals who 
actively welcome targeted marketing. “These people should not be 
dismissed as uninformed or foolish, as it is far from clear that the 
costs to these people outweigh the benefits” [59]. Individuals may 
share personal data willingly in one context for a specific purpose, 
but feel that their privacy was disregarded if the same information 
was shared with a wider audience or for another purpose. An 
example of the latter is the sharing of often intensely personal 
medical information for the greater benefit of others on 
PatientsLikeMe. There is also ample evidence of the ways in 
which changing social norms regarding the scope and nature of 
personal data shared can result in changes in how we see and/or 
participate in surveillance, self-surveillance or ‘the quantified self’ 
phenomenon, or sousveillance [32, 38, 41].  
 (2) We cannot disregard the fact that “the collection, use, and 
disclosure of personal data - even without consent - can lead to 
great benefits for individuals and society” [59]. There is, however, 
also ample evidence where the indiscriminate or compulsory 
collection of personal data results in the disenfranchising of 
already vulnerable populations and individuals [26, 28]. Solove 
therefore states that “Paternalism is much easier to justify when 
the consequences [of not collecting data] are clearly bad” [59]. 
A discursive-disclosive approach tells “both us and others what 
we did not previously know about our situations, the conditions 
under which we have been living and working and how we might 
be being exploited as, for example, in the extensive cross-
referencing of personal data…” [62]. We should therefore 
examine how we are encouraged, or coerced into sharing personal 
data. The outcome of this approach is not to declare surveillance 
either good or bad, but to understand “how it is dangerous and 
where the dynamic of resistance-compliance by all parties might 
be more effectively practiced” [62].  
2.1 Explicit opt in or opt out 
Many of the current models informing privacy self-management 
involve an explicit opt in/opt out choice (see for example [45]). 
Bellman et al [3] explore how the framing of questions and 
response defaults can impact on the opt-in or opt-out choices 
made by consumers. When provided with a choice to opt-in to 
receive marketing information, a majority of respondents wanted 
to make that choice on a case-by-case basis. Phrasing options as 
opt-out instead of opting in also changed the privacy preferences. 
The research found that marketers would predetermine users’ 
preferences by setting the default option as opting in when users 
don’t indicate a specific preference. The font size and the 
technical detail and complexity of the privacy policy documents 
also had a huge impact on users’ engagement and choices. It is 
therefore crucial to note their finding that “Opting-in does not 
equal opting-out, and answers are influenced by the default 
option” [3].  Based on their research, Bellman et al [3] suggest 
that everything possible should be done to encourage users to 
indicate a conscious choice. Without definite answers from users, 
no data collection should take place.     
While Solove initially supported the opt-in option, he questions 
the effectiveness and ethical foundations of opting in on the basis 
that “many organizations will have the sophistication and 
motivation to find ways to generate high opt-in rates” [59]. Often, 
as in the case with Apple’s iTunes, opting in is a prerequisite to 
basic use. “Despite the knowledge benefit of opt-in, there is a 
cost. In opt-in regimes, people affirmatively indicate their consent 
to data collection and sharing. With this clearer and more 
legitimate consent, companies might feel more entitled to use and 
disclose data more widely. In contrast, with opt-out, the consent 
procured is less legitimate than with opt-in regimes” [59; 
emphasis added].    
2.2 Increasing understanding and agency 
Despite the challenges, gaps, and unresolved issues of privacy 
self-management, Solove [59] suggests that it should not be 
abandoned – “Providing people with notice, access, and the 
ability to control their data is key to facilitating some autonomy in 
a world where decisions are increasingly being made about them 
with the use of personal data, automated processes, and 
clandestine rationales, and where people have minimal abilities to 
do anything about such decisions”.  Indeed the main beneficiary 
of increasing a broader understanding of the importance of 
privacy self-management is not necessarily the individual user, 
but rather companies. The need to address the practical 
implications of being transparent regarding the collection, 
analysis and use of personal data can force companies and 
corporations to address processes and clarify their own thinking. 
Zuckerman [71] and others [28, 64] point to an increase in user 
and consumer activism regarding the collection and use of 
personal data. The growth in “privacy enhancing technologies” 
(PETs) such as TrackMeNot, Tor, DuckDuckGo and Ghostery 
allow individuals to obfuscate or prevent the collection of search 
histories and other data. While privacy is “not complete control of 
our personal information, nor is it perfect secrecy” (Nissenbaum 
quoted by Zuckerman, [71]). Zuckerman [71] therefore proposes 
increased civic efficacy which involves advocacy to change laws 
and provide greater access to privacy protection and access to 
redress; as well as seeking change through markets, shaping social 
norms and through code.  
3. PROBLEMATISING AGENCY IN 
PRIVACY SELF-MANAGEMENT 
The question of whether to allow students to opt-out of having 
their learning data harvested and analysed seems out of place in 
the current social climate of “digital promiscuity” [48], where 
“sharing is caring” and “privacy is theft” [18] and given the 
prevalence of student indiscretions on social media [69]. Authors 
such as Kitchen [32] map the different actors in the field of use of 
personal data and there is clear indication that sousveillance and 
the sharing of personal information is increasing. Murphy [48] 
points to the irony that, in an age where we give up more of our 
personal information for free, we are increasingly worried about 
privacy. Despite, or rather, amidst the seemingly pervasive digital 
promiscuity, there are signs of “people beginning to exercise a bit 
more reserve online or otherwise engaging in subversive tactics to 
thwart data miners” [48]. (Also see [46, 63, 65].)  
3.1 The notion of informed consent 
Solove [59] states that “Privacy self-management envisions an 
informed and rational person who makes appropriate decisions 
about whether to consent to various forms of collection, use, and 
disclosure of personal data”. This vision of individuals’ ability to 
comprehend the issues at stake and to make rational decisions is 
perhaps far removed from reality.   
Solove [59] suggests that people “often lack enough expertise to 
adequately assess the consequences of agreeing to certain present 
uses or disclosures of their data. People routinely turn over their 
data for very small benefits” (also see [65]). This points to “a 
clear disconnect between people’s expressed high value of privacy 
and their behavior, which indicates a very low value of privacy” 
[59].    
Despite a general belief that individuals base their decisions on 
rational processes, we underestimate the “bounded rationality” 
people have as they negotiate meaning and compromise priorities 
within complex situations [59]. Trepte and Reinecke [65] 
emphasise that users make decisions regarding the sharing of data 
based on a cost-benefit analysis, shaped by their understanding of 
the costs and benefits, based on the amount and correctness of 
information they have to their disposal. Wang [66] therefore 
claims that users often trade privacy for convenience. There may 
be different layers of costs and benefits – and as Nissenbaum [49] 
indicates, context plays a crucial role in making decisions to opt-
in or opt-out. These contexts may also be dynamic and the use of 
personal data in one context or in a particular time may not 
necessarily be appropriate in another context or time. 
Users’ choices and their understanding of the scope and 
effectiveness of their privacy self-management are developed in 
context rather than in the abstract and “People are also more 
willing to share personal data when they feel in control, regardless 
of whether that control is real or illusory” [59].   
It is clear from a review of literature that there are concerns that 
most TOCs and policies on privacy are not read by most users, or 
if they are, are not well understood in terms of the regulations, 
costs and benefits. Users may lack the necessary background 
knowledge to make an informed choice. A further complicating 
factor is the different norms governing different context impact on 
the simplicity and context of the binary to opt-in or out at a 
particular moment in time [4, 7, 11, 25, 37, 49, 61].    
3.2 Problems with informed consent 
There are a number of impediments impacting on individuals’ 
ability to consent to or opt-out of the various forms of collection, 
use, and disclosure of personal data. These include practical 
problems with the notion and practice of informed consent such as 
the problem of scale, re-identification and the problem of 
aggregation, quality, accountability and purpose of data, 
limitations on use, openness and user agency.  
3.2.1 The problem of scale 
It is almost impossible for an individual to comprehend not only 
the scope of data collected, analysed and used, but the 
implications of the different layers of collection, analysis and use, 
with specific reference to third parties and other entities. “Even if 
every entity provided people with an easy and clear way to 
manage their privacy, there are simply too many entities that 
collect, use, and disclose people’s data for the rational person to 
handle” [59].  
It therefore becomes almost impossible for users to engage with 
each site’s terms and conditions in order to make informed 
choices. No matter how clear or transparent policies and terms 
and conditions are, it has become impossible due to the sheer 
scale of the collection, analysis and use.  
3.2.2 Re-identification and the problem of 
aggregation 
The relationship between privacy, identity and anonymity is more 
nuanced than often presumed, and “what appears at first blush to 
be a zero-sum game is in fact a set of interdependent 
relationships” [30]. The notion of opting out seems to imply that 
anonymity will ensure privacy – but increasingly this is not the 
case. Central to the “murky conceptual waters” of distinguishing 
(and regulating these distinctions) between the public and the 
private [44] is the need to recognise privacy as a social and 
political construct [68]. Not only does the notion of privacy have 
different connotations throughout history [53], it involves 
“multiple meanings over time and across cultures, contexts, kinds 
of persons and social categories” [44]. Privacy is embedded in 
existing socio-economic power relations and is increasingly a 
form of currency in “informational capitalism” [12]. 
Increasing complexity and a growing awareness of that 
complexity can often trigger a drive toward either further 
regulation or to the adoption of a paternalistic approach. Solove 
[59] suggests that “consent to collection, use, and disclosure of 
personal data is often not meaningful, but the most apparent 
solution - paternalistic measures - even more directly denies 
people the freedom to make consensual choices about their data”. 
A paternalistic approach may have been an appropriate solution in 
contexts where the use of data “had little benefit or were primarily 
detrimental to the individual or society”. Generally, the use of 
data is complex as the same set of data may have both benefits 
and costs for the individual or groups from which it was 
harvested. Different individuals within a group may then come to 
different conclusions regarding whether the costs of having that 
data collected outweighs the benefits.  
Privacy self-management has its origins in the Fair Information 
Practice Principles (FIPPs). Though Marx [43] states that the 
FIPPs are no longer adequate, for the purpose of this paper it is 
useful to briefly recap them. The principles include: “(1) 
transparency of record systems of personal data, (2) the right to 
notice about such record systems, (3) the right to prevent personal 
data from being used for new purposes without consent, (4) the 
right to correct or amend one’s records, and (5) responsibilities on 
the holders of data to prevent its misuse”. Solove [59] suggests 
that the FIPPs fail to clarify “what data may be collected or how it 
may be used. Instead, most forms of data collection, use, and 
disclosure are permissible under the FIPPs if individuals have the 
ability to self-manage their privacy — that is, if they are notified 
and provide consent”. Addressing the shortcomings of the FIPPs, 
Marx [43] proposed 29 questions to guide institutions and 
individuals through the ethical issues in surveillance. The 
questions covered aspects such as the means of collection, the 
data collection context, and uses of the collected data (see [56] for 
a discussion of Marx’s proposal and a framework for ethical 
learning analytics). 
Solove [59] suggests that rational decisions made regarding 
distinct datasets may struggle to include how that data might be 
aggregated in future. Individuals may share innocuous data in 
particular contexts, but it is the aggregation of these data points 
that reveals a picture that cannot be anticipated or foreseen at the 
moment of sharing.  
While the aggregation of data can also be beneficial to 
individuals, “it is virtually impossible for a person to make 
meaningful judgments about the costs and benefits of revealing 
certain data” [59]. There are too many unknowns with regard to 
how data may be combined at a certain future point in time, when 
the original context in which the data was captured is no longer 
known. A cost-benefit analysis that includes a range of possible 
harms and benefits is not only almost impossible to do, but is also 
dependent on context [49].   
A presumed advantage of aggregation is the assumption of 
anonymity. However, while a single data point may not be 
personally identifiable, the aggregation of a number of data points 
may actually result in the identification of the individual involved. 
“As data gets aggregated, information that is not identifiable can 
become identified” [59]. 
3.2.3 Quality, accountability and purpose of data 
Big Data refers not only to increasingly high volumes, but also to 
data’s velocity. It incorporates both structured and unstructured 
data, and may be exhaustive in scope, striving to capture both 
entire populations of systems and fine-grained resolution, and 
have an inherent ability to be combined and related to other and 
different data-sets [32]. In this emerging world then, it becomes 
easier for the original purpose for the collection of any dataset to 
be lost as “new uses for data are discovered over time” [8]. As 
data becomes further removed from its original purpose and 
context of collection, there may be impacts on its quality and fit 
within its new context. With the increased brokering of data, it 
also becomes almost impossible to trace and enforce 
accountability. We therefore witness an increasing context-
collapse in the use of data.  
3.2.4 Limitations on use 
Cate and Mayer-Schönberger [8] state that, although there is 
agreement that the “Use limitation principle” adopted in 1980 is 
no longer workable, it is not clear what should replace it. 
According to this principle, personal data should not be used, 
disclosed, nor made available, other than for the original purpose 
of the collection, except with the explicit consent of the data 
subject or by the authority of law. 
3.2.5 Openness 
Should data be collected without opportunities to get consent, 
Cate and Mayer-Schönberger [8] suggest that “information about 
the data subjects’ legal rights, and ways to exercise them, be made 
available with information about data processing activities”.  
3.2.6 User agency 
Although there is general agreement with regard to individuals 
rights to know and to have access to data, there are concerns 
regarding to the “significant burdens for both data processors and 
data subjects in a world of Big Data” [8].  There are basically 
three concerns. Firstly, with the amount of data collected as well 
as the different role players (known and unknown), “access to 
such data could be prohibitively expensive and seemingly of little 
value if the data are not being used for any significant purpose”, 
for example, as part of broad-based research rather than a 
requirement to determine a specific benefit [8]. The second 
concern relates to the burden on individuals to establish the 
different parties with access to their data, and the possibility that 
data may have been de-identified for use. Thirdly, by focusing on 
individual agency and participation, the burden on data stewards 
may be excessive without really addressing the need for 
fundamental fairness in data. See, for example Marx [43].  
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY 
Content analysis as methodology is an established methodology in 
quantitative and qualitative research designs [5, 15, 19, 27]. Hsieh 
and Shannon [27] describe content analysis as “a family of 
analytical approaches ranging from impressionistic, intuitive, 
interpretative analysis to systematic, strict textual analyses”. 
Qualitative content analysis “is defined as a research method for 
the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the 
systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes 
or patterns”. Elo and Kyngäs [19] state that the aim of content 
analysis is “to attain a condensed and broad description of the 
phenomenon, and the outcome of the analysis is concepts or 
categories describing the phenomenon” resulting in a “model, 
conceptual system, conceptual map or categories”. 
In following Elo and Kyngäs [19], we developed a categorisation 
matrix based on constructs formulated from the literature review. 
Validity, reliability and trustworthiness in deductive content 
analysis, are furthermore addressed by transparency regarding the 
process including the selection of analytical constructs from the 
literature review, coding, member checking of the codes, 
constructs and analyses [15, 19, 70]. 
The credibility of this study was based on frameworks provided 
by Elo and Kyngäs [19] and Lincoln and Guba [35, 36]. A 
thorough literature review resulted in a categorization matrix and 
referential adequacy and member checking and peer debriefing. 
Transferability was ensured through thick descriptions and 
reference to the source documents. Process notes and an 
electronic paper trail provide an audit trail. 
Three providers of massive open online courses (MOOCs) were 
selected for this study, namely Coursera [13], edX [17], and 
FutureLearn [21]. The Terms and Conditions of the three 
providers exported into an MSWord file, and analysed through 
coding and the formulation of themes.  
The analytical constructs used in the analysis included the 
following: 
a. Length of Terms and Conditions 
b. Types of data collected 
c. Methods of data collection 
d. Conditions for sharing the data collected 
e. Uses of data 
f. User access to, responsibility and control of data 
g. Institutional duty of care 
5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF 
FINDINGS 
5.1 Length of Terms and Conditions (TOC) 
It is clear from the literature review, e.g., [3, 59] that most users 
of online services do not read the TOCs due to the amount of 
reading as well as the sometimes technical nature of the 
documents. An analysis of the length of the TOC (including 
privacy policies and honor codes) of the three providers show that 
the documents were between 5,965 words or 13 pages (Coursera) 
and 8,565 words or 22 pages (FutureLearn). The documents cover 
a wide variety of topics, in different orders, levels of detail and 
uses of technical terms. It falls outside the scope of this paper to 
compare the content of these TOCs, but it is interesting to note 
that the number of headings in these TOCs range between 30 
headings and subheadings in the Coursera TOC to 41 in the edX 
TOC. Another interesting aspect of a typographic analysis of these 
texts shows that the amount of text in bold and capitals (excluding 
headings) range from 460 (edX), 784 (Coursera) and none for 
FutureLearn. Research [23] has shown that typefaces impact not 
only on the readability of the text but also on the emotions created 
in readers with bold and capitalized text being seen as more 
serious.  
5.2 Types of data collected 
Privacy policies for most organisations involved in education 
discuss their use of both personally identifiable data (for example, 
contact details and other demographic information) and non-
personal data (for example, webpages visited, etc.).  
5.2.1 Personally identifiable data 
Only edX provides a definition of personal information while 
Coursera contrasts personal information with non-personal 
information as “information that cannot be used to identity you.” 
All three providers require a range of personal information from 
users in order to register for courses, such as email addresses, 
contact details, gender, and date of birth. edX also require a 
photograph to verify students’ identities for accreditation 
purposes. All three providers make it very clear that they collect 
the personally identifiable information that users directly provide. 
Interestingly, FutureLearn also includes the following “we may 
receive information about you from third parties (such as credit 
reference agencies) who are legally entitled to disclose that 
information” (Privacy Policy; emphasis added). Both Coursera 
and edX flag that their tracking of non-personal information may 
yield further information that could be also used to identify 
personal data, such as location or IP addresses. In contrast, 
FutureLearn’s policy explicitly states that it will “collect data 
relating to forum posts which “cannot identify you”. 
5.2.2 Non-personal information 
Both Coursera and edX mention that they aggregate non-personal 
information, for example, sites visited, and hyperlinks ‘clicked.’ 
FutureLearn does not refer at all to aggregation of data, but states 
that “We may also collect data relating to your visits to the 
Website that cannot identify you but records your use of our 
Website”.  
5.3 Methods of data collection 
All three providers mention the use of cookies to collect personal 
and non-personal information. Coursera, however, adds that 
“From time to time we may also use additional typical methods of 
collecting data”. No further information is provided with regard to 
the type of data or methods.  Though all three providers indicate 
that users can disable cookies, they each warn that this may 
impact on the functionality of the service provided. FutureLearn 
has a separate Cookie Policy which it also contains an overview 
of the different types of cookies and even provides a list of 
cookies used in the collection of data.  
5.4 Conditions for sharing the data collected 
Coursera does not specify any conditions under which collected 
personalised data will be used and/or shared. With regard to 
sharing non-personalised information it states “We may also use it 
for other business purposes”. Coursera goes on to state that it may 
use personally identifiable information collected on the Forums 
and it “may publish this information via extensions of our 
Platform that use third-party services, like mobile applications”.  
Both edX and FutureLearn have more information regarding the 
conditions under which collected data will be shared. edX will 
share collected data with affiliated universities on condition that 
the information is treated in a confidential manner and protected. 
Only personal information required to “fulfill the purpose stated 
at the time of collection” will be shared. FutureLearn states that 
personalised information will be shared with the consent of the 
individual in question, or to prospective sellers or buyers of 
assets, or should it be compelled under legal obligations to do so. 
These last two conditions are also covered by Coursera and edX. 
FutureLearn is the only provider who mentions obtaining the 
consent of the relevant individual.  
5.5 Uses of data 
Coursera does not have a specific section dealing with the uses of 
data, but lists potential uses under the types of data collected. All 
three providers included information regarding the collection of 
data with the purpose to provide, administer, evaluate and 
improve the offerings and services. The providers also 
acknowledged that they collect data to understand (FutureLearn), 
facilitate (Coursera) and individualise the learning/browsing 
experience (edX, FutureLearn).  
Coursera and edX mention specifically the collection of data to 
authenticate the user’s identity and track both individual and 
aggregate attendance, progress and completion. 
edX is the only provider to mention the collection of data to 
monitor and detect violations, to publish, for purposes made clear 
at the point of collection. edX and FutureLearn mention explicitly 
that data may be collected for research purposes while Coursera 
state that data may also be collected for business purposes. 
Somehow related to this is FutureLearn’s acknowledgement that 
collected data may be used to sell sponsorship. 
Coursera states that identifiable information generated by 
students, such as forum postings, may be both published and later 
shared with others (through reuse). edX goes a little further to 
state that any forum posts are fully owned by edX in perpetuity 
and may be later exploited in whole or in part. Forum posts are 
analysed to obtain information about student performance and 
patterns of learning, but it is not clear whether this information is 
de-personalised or may be linked directly to student identity and 
other personal data. Not only that, but any other user of the edX 
site (both current and in the future) is granted license to access 
and use student posts (which may contain the student username) 
for their own personal purposes. Perhaps because of this, edX 
encourages students to adopt usernames that keep their identities 
concealed, but, requires at the same time, that students must 
commit not to misrepresent their identities. FutureLearn, on the 
other hand, insists that students use real names as identifiers and 
encourages users to openly share (with them and with other 
students) details of their location, gender and education history to 
“help other learners get to know you and help us to tailor the 
service to suit you”. 
5.6 User access to, responsibility and control 
of data 
5.6.1 Opting out is not an option 
Though all three providers are very transparent with regard to the 
fact that they collect, use and share data; none of the providers 
provide users the option to opt out of the collection of data, 
whether personalised data or in aggregated form. All three 
providers do provide users with the option to opt out of allowing 
cookies, but with the warning that this may impact negatively on 
the quality of the service provided.  
5.6.2 The duty of care 
All three providers also make it very clear that, outside of the 
required personal information needed, they will use whatever 
personal information users provide to them. Users are also warned 
that once shared, the provider cannot guarantee the security and 
safety of the implications of the sharing of information. Coursera, 
for example, states “Please note that we do not guarantee the 
security of Personally Identifiable Information, and there is some 
risk that an unauthorized third party may find a way to circumvent 
our security systems or that transmission of your information over 
the Internet will be intercepted”.  
5.6.3 User responsibility for correctness of data 
All three providers make it clear that users have the responsibility 
to ensure that the required data provided is correct and current. 
FutureLearn, for example, states: “You can edit your personal 
details via your profile page whenever you wish.  We maintain a 
procedure in order to help you confirm that your personal 
information remains correct and up-to-date or choose whether or 
not you wish to receive material from us or some of our partners”. 
(See section 5.5 regarding impersonation and false identities). It 
warns that “You acknowledge that if any information provided by 
you in relation to your Learner Account is untrue, inaccurate, not 
current or incomplete, we reserve the right to suspend or terminate 
your access to and use of the Website and your enrolment in the 
Online Content and Courses”  
5.6.4 User concerns regarding privacy and data use 
All three providers provide users an opportunity to raise concerns 
or question policy by sending an email,  For example, edX states: 
“If you have privacy concerns, have disclosed data you would 
prefer to keep private, or would like to access the information we 
maintain about you, please contact us at privacy@edx.org”.  
Only FutureLearn provides users with the possibility to access the 
data it holds for a small fee, stating “You have the right to contact 
us in order to find out what information we hold about you … or 
to access, cancel or correct any information that we hold about 
you.” 
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEARNING 
ANALYTICS 
6.1 The duty of reciprocal care 
From the literature review, analysis and findings it is clear that the 
duty of care is shared between providing institutions and users – 
albeit embedded in an asymmetrical power relationship. In the 
TOCs of the three providers analysed, any suggestion of a balance 
of power would be nonsensical. The power to harvest, analyse and 
exploit data lies completely with the provider. It is tempting to 
state that the only real option available to users to have more 
control over their data is to not use the provider at all. However, it 
is also clear that this is not a realistic, nor an appropriate response.  
What has become clear within the scope of duty and care is that 
both duty and care have reciprocal elements. Having said this, it is 
important to also note that, due to the heavy imbalance in the 
power relationship, the main responsibility lies with the provider 
to ensure transparency, security and reasonable care (see section 
6.2 for further discussion). 
The social contract and fiduciary duty of HEIs and other 
educational providers therefore necessitate that providers 
• Make their TOCs as accessible and understandable as 
possible. There is a vast difference between reading the TOCs 
of Coursera and edX compared with FutureLearn – the latter 
being more accessible, albeit longer.  
• Make it clear what data is collected, for what purposes, and 
with whom data may be shared (and under what conditions).  
• Provide users with access to information and data held about 
them, and to verify or correct conclusions drawn, where 
necessary, as well as provide context, if appropriate. 
• Provide users with access to a neutral ombudsperson who can 
ensure that concerns and issues raised are addressed in a 
consistent and just manner. Though the three providers in this 
study provide users with an email address, this is not enough. 
Complaints and concerns should be addressed to a neutral 
third person or agency.  
• Ensure that users are provided with opportunities to verify and 
update personal information. 
6.2 The contextual integrity of privacy and 
data 
One of the major concerns in the discourses in surveillance and 
privacy studies is the issue of contextual integrity of privacy and 
personal data (see, for example [49]). Data and information that 
are collected and/or shared in one context lose contextual integrity 
when shared or used out of context.  
6.3 Student agency and privacy self-
management 
Due to the fact that the power-relationship between students and 
their higher education institution is, per se, asymmetrical, it is 
crucial to embrace the proposal by Slade and Prinsloo [57] to see 
learning analytics as moral practice. Should the social contract 
between students and institution [29, 31] be seriously considered, 
learning analytics as moral practice provides form and function to 
the fiduciary [14, 34] and duty of care [42] that higher education 
has towards students. The social contract and fiduciary duty of 
care provides a crucial basis for thinking critically about the range 
of student control over what data will be analysed, for what 
purposes, and how students will have access to verify, correct or 
supply additional information [34]. When students are seen as 
active collaborators and agents in the harvesting, analysis and use 
of their data [57], the potential for thinking outside of the binary 
of opting in or out becomes a real possibility.  
Despite concerns regarding the digital promiscuity [48] of 
students and their apparent lack of care with regard to uncritical 
sharing of information, HEIs have a moral obligation to not only 
make students aware of the implications, but also to provide a 
platform for empowering students with civic agency regarding 
their data.  
From the above, it is clear that informed consent is not a simple 
matter, and that most users don’t understand the full implications 
of opting in or out from allowing their data to be used and 
analysed. It is furthermore clear that student surveillance in higher 
education should not be thought of in terms of just good or evil 
[53], but as a necessary and crucial tool within the context of the 
social contract and duty of care.  
HEIs should therefore not accept as default a non-response from 
users regarding the collection of data as equal to opting in. 
Bellman et al [3] suggest that “no data collection or use should 
occur until a definite answer has been received from the 
consumer”. The costs and benefits of accepting the TOC should 
be clear to users at the outset [59].  
6.4 Future direction and reflection 
6.4.1 Rethinking Consent and Employing Nudges 
The “murky conceptual waters” [44] of distinguishing between 
public and private, and the fact that the notion of valid consent 
can vary depending on the area and jurisdiction of law considered, 
does not make easier the task of reconsidering the role of privacy 
self-management. It is not always clear to the user what granting 
consent to having one’s data collected, analysed and used actually 
means. Considering the asymmetrical power relation between the 
service consumer or user and the provider, does the user really 
have an option? In line with the thinking of Trepte and Reinecke 
[65] that we should not underestimate the reciprocal aspect of 
data sharing and use, and issues of cost and benefit, how do we 
safeguard against misuse? Solove [59] therefore suggests that 
“consent is far more nuanced, and privacy law needs a new 
approach that accounts for the nuances without getting too 
complex to be workable”. 
One possible solution might be to employ an approach of 
nudging, or presumed consent, much discussed in the fields of 
health and energy policy. Nudging, which draw on approaches 
developed within behavioural economics, works to steer 
individual decision making so as to make individuals better off 
without breaching their free choice. It may be argued that nudge 
policies are based on principles of soft paternalism, in that they 
make it easier for people in act in ways that support both the 
policy owner’s and the broader public’s best interests. However, it 
is thought that a nudge approach may provide an acceptable 
middle ground between paternalism and privacy self-management.   
6.4.2 Developing Partial Privacy Self-Management 
Accepting that users have the right to choose but may also not 
have the time nor necessarily the knowledge to micromanage 
every aspect of personal data use, a further potential solution 
might be to embrace partial self-management. Solove [59] 
proposes that individuals might be able to “manage their privacy 
globally for all entities rather than one at a time”. This, however, 
raises a different issue namely “to find a uniform set of privacy 
options that makes sense for all entities, and the consequences of 
data collection, use, or disclosure might differ depending upon 
which entities are involved” [59].   
6.4.3 Adjusting Privacy’s Timing and Focus 
The current emphasis is that individuals choose how they want 
their data to be used at the moment of using a particular service or 
network – and often, at that stage, they either don’t care or simply 
don’t have the information needed to make an informed decision. 
“Therefore, the focus should be more on downstream uses rather 
than on the time of the initial collection of data” [59]. The 
benefits in opting in or out may not be apparent at the time the 
data is collected. “New ideas for combining data, new discoveries 
in data aggregation and analysis, and new techniques and 
technologies of data analysis might change the benefits side of the 
equation. They might change the costs side as well” [59].  
Solove [59] suggests that users may be provided different options 
such as outright restrictions, partial consent depending on the 
scope, context and timing, and permission to harvest and use data 
with an option to later revoke consent or change the scope of 
consent depending on the context or circumstances.   
6.4.4 Moving Toward Substance over Neutrality 
Solove [59] further proposes that the law “should develop and 
codify basic privacy norms. Such codification need not be overly 
paternalistic — it can be in a form like the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC), where certain default rules can be waived” [59]. 
This will result in “More substantive rules about data collection, 
use, and disclosure could consist of hard boundaries that block 
particularly troublesome practices as well as softer default rules 
that can be bargained around” [59].    
Certainly, within the European Union [20], the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive (95/46/EC), is being updated to reflect the 
ways in which technological progress and globalisation have 
profoundly changed the way data is collected, accessed and used.  
The draft regulation requires that consent to the processing of 
personal data be given explicitly; and a right for data subjects to 
be forgotten, including the right to obtain erasure of personal data 
available publicly online. The new regulation is expected to be 
adopted in 2014, with implementation two years later, in 2016. 
(Also take note of [45]). 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Within higher education, the enthusiasm that surrounds the 
emergence of learning analytics and its ability to offer 
differentiated support can overwhelm the detail of its 
implementation, particularly with regard to issues of consent. 
HEIs, on the whole, have adopted a paternalistic approach, often 
electing either to not inform students of the ways in which their 
data is being used to track progress or to offer partial insight with 
no opportunity to opt out. However, it is clear that the way 
forward cannot simply be to introduce a choice between opt-in or 
opt-out.  
HEIs must engage more proactively with students, to inform and 
more directly involve them in the ways in which both individual 
and aggregated data is being used. It should not be blithely 
assumed that HEIs can, or indeed will, be able to work for the 
benefit of individual students, and, indeed, who decides what is in 
the best interests of individuals? Only by increasing the 
transparency around learning analytics activities will HEIs gain 
the trust and fuller co-operation of students. As Solove [59] states 
“The way forward involves (1) developing a coherent approach to 
consent, one that accounts for the social science discoveries about 
how people make decisions about personal data; (2) recognizing 
that people can engage in privacy self management only 
selectively; (3) adjusting privacy law’s timing to focus on 
downstream uses; and (4) developing more substantive privacy 
rules. These are enormous challenges, but they must be tackled.”     
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